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RECENT DECISIONS

Real Property-Equitable Servitude-Application in Situations
Not Involving a Building Scheme-The owners of a parcel of land
laid out into a number of lots conveyed one of the lots to the appellees
(for use as a filling station), by deed providing that the grantors for
themselves, their heirs and assigns, convenanted with the grantees,
their heirs and assigns that for twenty-five years the only lot in the
parcel which could be used for a gasoline station was that conveyed
to the grantees. Some time later, the grantors conveyed the rest of
the parcel to third persons by deed which recited the basic provisions
of the covenant stated above. The grantees of the second deed conveyed three of the lots of the parcel to the appellants by deed containing the following provision: "Subject, however, to a covenant
of record against the use as a gasoline station on any part of said lots
created in a certain deed * * * [dated March 20, 1942]." In 1949
appellants informed appellees of their intention to erect and operate
a filling station on the lots acquired by them. Appellees sought and
obtained a decree enjoining such action. This appeal is from that
decree and is based chiefly on the contention that the covenant in question is personal to the parties to the original agreement, does not run
with the land, and is thus not enforceable against assignees of the
grantors. Held: The covenant is enforceable. Citing earlier cases,'
the Maryland Court of Appeals disposed of the contention that the
covenant did not run with the land by stating that a grantor may
impose a restriction on land he sells in favor of land retained, or on
land retained in favor of land sold, and if the restriction is made
binding on heirs and assigns of both the grantor and grantee, it is enforceable against a violating assignee with notice, without respect to
the question as to whether the covenant did or did not in legal sense,
run with the land. Raney et ux. v. Tompkins et ux., 78 A 2d 183
(JMaryland, 1951).
The salient feature of the above noted case is its application of the
equitable servitude doctrine to a situation not involving a building
scheme. While it is true that the doctrine has been invoked chiefly
in the latter situations, it is by no means true that the theory is restricted to such cases. 2 Indeed, the doctrine had its genesis in an action in3
volving restrictions placed upon a single lot.
Equitable servitude is an equitable maxim which provides that one
taking land with notice that its use is subject to an agreement such as
that in the instant case, will not in equity and good conscience, be permitted to violate its terms. Through the use of the doctrine, equity
recognizes rights,
2 Halle v. Newbold, 69 Md. 265, 14 A. 662 (1888) ; Newbold v. Peabody Heights

Co., 70 Md. 493, 17 A. 372 (1889).
2 Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P. 2d 490 (1940).
Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Chan. 1848).
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"... without profit, which the owner of land has acquired, by
contract or estoppel, to restrict or regulate, for the benefit
of his own property, the use and enjoyment of the land of
another. . .. '"
and achieves results similar to those obtained through the use of
covenants real, namely, binding future assigns of land to the terms of
an agreement respecting its use, without regard to whether the restriction touches or concerns the lands affected, 5 and with little, if any,
emphasis on the formalities essential to the later type of covenant.6
The similarity in result achieved has caused restrictive covenants of
this type to be labelled equitable substitutes for, or adjuncts to, the
legal rule of covenants running with the land, though the controlling
question in equity is, not whether the covenant does or does not so
run, but,
.. .whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a
manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his
vendor, and with notice of which he purchased .. ,,"
Whether the maxim is being applied with reference to a situation
involving a building scheme, that is, a case where uniform building
restrictions have been imposed pursuant to a general plan for improving an entire tract or real estate subdivision, 8 or to limitations of use
placed upon a single parcel of land, equity bases its decision on two
factors, namely: Did the original parties intend that the restriction
should be binding on subsequent owners, and, did the party resisting
the limitation take the land with notice of it?
The intent element is examined with great particularity in view
of the courts' aversion to unusual restrictions on land, and, ". . . such
covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of the premises
for all lawful purposes. . . ."' In determining the intent element, equity
looks to the language of the agreement, giving the words their ordinary and popular sense, unless they are technical; the entire context of
the agreement taken as a unity; the circumstances surrounding the
agreement; the nature and character of the land; the purpose of the
restriction; who is to benefit thereby ;1o and, where a building scheme
is involved, to-the existence of a uniform plan of development with
relatively consistent restrictions intended to bind and be for the benefit
of all the lots within a defined area of operation." In the case of oral
4Edward Q. Keasbey, Restrictions Upon the Use of Land, 6 HARV. L. REv. 280

(1892).
5Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N.Y. 244, 17 N.E. 335 (1887). Contra: Norcross v. James,
140 Mass. 188, 2. N.E. 946 (1885).
6 Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis. 659, 111 N.W. 701 (1907).
7

Supra, Note 3.
8 Supra, Note 2.
9 Peterson v. Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 139, 210 N.W. 407 (1926) ; accord: Roberts v.
Gerber, 187 Wis. 282, 202 N.W. 701 (1925).
10 14 C. J. S. 192.
"1Schneider v. Eckhoff, 188 Wis. 550, 206 N.W. 838 (1926).
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covenants recognized in some jurisdictions, 2 the circumstances indicating intent must show the same by necessary and unavoidable implication. 13
When it has been decided that the restriction was intended to be
appurtenant to the land, the court proceeds to determine whether the
party denying its validity was aware of its existence when he purchased, or succeeded to, the land. A bona fide purchaser for value
without notice of the restriction takes free of the same, but no one
taking land with notice of an equity therein, can stand in a different
situation from his predecessor in title."4 The theories of constructive
and actual notice are used to determine whether or not an assignee
had such knowledge of a restriction so as to be bound by its terms,
and equity will enforce a restrictive covenant against a grantee taking
title through a deed reciting the covenant, against a grantee taking
title with full knowledge of its existence although it be omitted from
his deed,' 5 or against a grantee with constructive notice of the restriction because reference to it appears in a deed within his chain of title.' 6
In a Wisconsin case, Boyden v. Roberts,'7 an agreement imposing restrictions on the use of land pursuant to a general scheme was executed
at the time of granting of a deed. The agreement was by separate
instrument, and no reference to the restriction was made in the deed.
The court held that the two instruments must be construed together
with the result that an equitable servitude was found to exist. They
further held that the agreement was a conveyance within the meaning
of Section 235.50 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 8 and as such was entitled to be recorded, and when recorded gave constructive notice
of its contests to subsequent purchasers. Actual notice, or knowledge
of such facts as would put an ordinarily prudent person on inquiry,
which if prosecuted with reasonable diligence would disclose a restriction, is also sufficient to bind a purchaser to its terms, 9 though it
appears that the latter situation would more usually appear in building
scheme cases where uniformity of position or type of home might be
said to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry. 20 One who alleges
21
lack of knowledge has the burden of proving same.
HUGH R. O'CONNELL
12Thornton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 Pac. 617 (1926).
13 Supra, Note 6.

14 Supra,Note 3.
,5 Huntley v. Stanchfield, 174 Wis. 565, 183 N.W. 984 (1921); 26 C. J. S.

DEEDS,

§167 p. 547).
16 Mueller v. Schier, 189 Wis. 70, 205 N.W. 912 (1925).
17 Supra, Note 6.
Is Wis. STATs. (1949), Sec. 235.50, "The term conveyance... shall be construed
to embrace every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real

estate ...may be affected in law or equity ..... "
19 Talmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1862).
2014 Am. JuR. COVENANTS §329.
2t POMEROY,

EQurrY

JURISPRUDENCE,

Sec. 1295 (5th ed. 1941).

